Lessons from the 7 July London bombings
Even though Richard Barnes, Chair of the 7 July Review (London Resilience) Committee, acknowledges that massive progress has been made since 7 July, he criticises shortcomings in mobile communications used by the police and London Underground
The lessons learnt from the 7 July 2005 bombings in London can be applied to any catastrophic event, no matter where it occurs, in the country.
The recent floods in the Midlands and the West Country are a case in point. Who knew that water levels were rising? Who did they tell? Did they interpret the information or simply pass on raw data? Was the data interpreted, and by whom, to establish threat levels and to identify critical weak points and threats to infrastructure? What were the general public told, and when?
At what point was preventive action taken and emergency plans put into operation? Were evacuation plans in place to protect hospitals, schools, nursing homes and the vulnerable?
Was positive action delayed or avoided because of fears of ultimate financial liability? Who directed the deployment of critical equipment and rescue efforts? What was the media and communications strategy?
What plans were in place for an effective rescue operation and the provision of support for those affected by the floods, and how effective were they? Were business continuity and resilience plans in place? Were they effective? What on going care and support is needed, and for how long, to ensure and sustain a return to normalcy?
The 7 July Review Committee of the London Assembly in its Report of June 2006 conducted such an examination of the issues, in public, following the detonation of four bombs on the London transport system on the 7 July 2005.
In August of this year the Committee published the first of two follow up reports, the second will be subsequent to further hearings in November 2007. The purpose of this Report was to examine progress following the identification of 54 recommendations in June 2006.
The committee was very pleased to note that some 40 of the recommendations had been accepted by the services, the Metropolitan Police, London City Police, the London Ambulance Service, London Fire Brigade, the NHS, Transport for London, and the recommendations had been either fully implemented or are works in progress.
As a consequence, the ability of the services in London to respond to a catastrophic event are certainly enhanced and it has to be recognised and acknowledged that massive progress has been made since 7 July 2005.
Tube carriages now have emergency notices in them. Stores of emergency dressing packs are now established across London, re-supply systems for ambulances has been established, the London Ambulance Service has opened a new emergency control centre to better deploy ambulances and equipment, The Emergency Rescue Unit of London Underground can now drive in TfL bus lanes without penalty and they benefit from a 100% reduction in the congestion charge.
A new system has been established by the Fire Brigade and London Underground Limited (LUL) to pin point where incidents have occurred on the tube network with the objective of minimising "split attendance". A system that LAS has linked into and the Met Police are examining with a view to using.
It has been acknowledged that communication with survivors, both injured and non-injured, is essential and responsibilities for this communication has been assumed by the police and ambulance services.
Torches are now available both in the drivers cabs and at stations. Communications systems are being rolled out across the tube network and dates have been established for the roll out of airwave digital radio systems within London Underground and across the blue light services.
London is in a better position to respond to a major event than it was two years ago, but most importantly, the men and women who are in the front line of rescue operations can operate more effectively, efficiently and safely than they could before.
Not all of the recommendations were readily accepted. One that was initially rejected was the recommendation that reception centres be established for survivors. It was rejected on the grounds that the first responsibility of the rescue services was to rescue individuals and to evacuate the scene.
Whilst plausible this position is not sustainable in the face of chemical, biological or dirty bombs (CBRN) when survivors have to be decontaminated, identified and tracked after the event. The endorsement of this recommendation by the Home Office in its own Report has led to the initial response from the services to be re-examined.
The Review Committee has also identified both programme slippage and a number of weaknesses in the Airwave programme that must be addressed.
The Fire Service and the London Ambulance Service both report a delay of some 18 months in the roll out of Airwave within their services. LUL have confirmed that their programme, CONNECT, will not be in place before the end of 2008.
More disturbing, LUL has rejected the purchase and deployment of interim solutions, that would also serve as a back up facility once installation is complete, such as personal role radios. Readily available, off the shelf and a proven technology, they would bridge the interim gap.
The Metropolitan Police Service will have completed its roll out of Airwave to all 32 London Boroughs by September 2007. However, the Met has given in evidence that problems with the system will remain after that date. The problems include those of capacity, penetration and coverage. The system will be ineffective within some buildings, vehicles, and does not have the capacity to accommodate all talk groups.
To establish penetration at the new Wembley Stadium cost the Met an additional £2.5 million. The original contract, signed in 2002, called for Airwave to be effective at "ground level in the open air". In a metropolitan district strewn with buildings in which police officers travel in vehicles with a fatal flaw is something which which the Committee will be pursuing at its next hearing in November.
The technological solution is there, the will to resolve the issue is there, the money must be there. Given the major building programme that is now in place in London with the development of the transport network, and the build programme for the Olympics, "secure by design" must be established as a guiding principle from the outset.
I am often asked if London is now safer than it was on the 7 July. That is a question that only the security services can answer. It London better able to respond to a major event than it was on July 7 2005, without doubt the answer to that is without question "yes" and the improvements are ongoing, all of the time.
Richard Barnes represents Ealing & Hillingdon in the London Assembly. He is Chair of the 7 July Review (London Resilience) Committee and a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority
