Jinnah's house
Making Sense of Pakistan An Alternate View
RAND Corporation policy analyst, Farhana Ali, says critics downplay the many achievements Pakistan has made under Musharraf. By decorating their political slogans with words such as reform and freedom, both Bhutto and Sharif have fooled the world community
In a recent meeting, a high-ranking Pakistani politician who recently defected from Ms. Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) told me his prediction for the future of his country. "The general election of January 8, 2008 will result in one big fat COW [which stands for a coalition of the willing]. There will be a loose coalition of several political parties. No one will be strong." The concept of a coalition is not unique. U.S. President Bush employs the phrase "coalition of the willing" to refer to key states supporting the U.S.-led war in Iraq. However, for the former PPP-politician, the "COW" he expects in Pakistan's next election will likely sideline the Islamist parties, including the mainstream and hardliners. If elections are viewed as legitimate and legal, then Pakistan may be able to transition into a democracy.
However, privately, many U.S.-based Pakistani scholars indicate that a kangaroo-style election will neither empower nor evolve into judicial reform or political reformation. In hushed tones, few Pakistani experts do not tell me that "Pakistan does not deserve Musharraf. People have forgotten what he has done for the country." That only-the-army-can-serve a country of 160 million or more people has others incensed with rage. The reality is that Musharraf's image is now scared by the international community and opponents at home. People in Pakistan seem to have too few choices: they are either disgusted with an ex-General still in power or disillusioned with weak political opponents, Nawaz Sharif and Ms. Bhutto, both of whom have made their own share of historical mistakes.
At the heart of any discussion vis-à-vis Pakistan is Musharraf's misadventures in South Asia and fealty to the army he represents. The crispest rebuke is from U.S.-based Pakistan experts, some so far removed from reality-based events and outcomes that their disdain for Musharraf has reawakened Washington's sensibilities, forcing a debate among U.S. and European experts on how to move Pakistan towards real democracy—an experiment the country has thus far not experienced.
Mistakes and Misfortunes?
General Pervez Musharraf is badly wounded and is today a target of daily accusations and disgraceful insults by both Westerners and Pakistanis, alike. The anti-spectacular attacks by democratic enthusiasts, who rally behind liberal values rooted in medieval Western traditions, blame the former General—now a civilian President—for widening the insurgency in Pakistan's northern areas, weakening civilian institutions, and imposing emergency rule to court a new entourage of leaders. Through reckless and crowd-pleasing clichés, Musharraf's opponents have defined the uproar that has spread throughout U.S. and European circles, deeming the former General a demon, a dictator, and a deceitful ally in the war on terror. To understand that Musharraf symbolizes a modicum of stability and security for a populous nation, I choose to look past the orchestra of cacophonic voices that have dominated the media in recent months.
Focused on his blunders, critics downplay the many achievements Pakistan has made under Musharraf's tutelage over the past eight years. The President's sound fiscal decisions are reflected in the 2007 assessment by the Index of Economic Freedom. Islamabad has scored well in fiscal freedom, business freedom and labor liberty. First, Musharraf has created a liberal business climate that has enabled Pakistani entrepreneurs and corporations to prosper, particularly in the port city of Karachi. The relative calm in Karachi, alone, has contributed to 40 percent of the country's economic output. Other enabling factors include a significant increase in investment in Pakistan from the Arab world and an influx of returning expatriate Pakistanis including business leaders who have started companies which other professionals have invested in.
According to one Pakistani writer, the "resilient economy" in Pakistan is no mistake. Under Musharraf, Pakistan has emerged one of Asia's fastest growing economies, with an average growth rate at seven percent. Privatization of the public sector as well as reforms in its banking sector has helped Pakistan move from near collapse to a country that has made bold, macroeconomic achievements. Compare this to Sharif and Bhutto's previous leadership, where fiscal mismanagement set the country back decades.
Granted, wide-ranging macroeconomic reforms have not reduced rampant corruption—Pakistan is one of the 20 most corrupt nations, according to the Index. Fretted with a historical record of corrupt officials, both within the Civil Service and the Judiciary, years of honest reform and well-crafted policies will have minimal impact unless a system that nurtures bureaucratic inertia and feudal-tribal lords is eradicated.
Second, Musharraf is Pakistan's best option, for now. In a meeting in his Karachi home, the legendary A Cowasjee said to me, ""Musharraf is the best of the worst lot. Pakistan can not afford to lose him. The other political contenders have nothing here," and pointed to his forehead. Echoed by a retired Pakistani military officer, "Should the world lose Musharraf, the West will be nostalgic for a man who knew how to deliver."
No doubt, many in the West resent the idea of a one-man-show in Islamabad. Many in Pakistan are ready for change though it is not all too clear if Musharraf's main two protagonists will be capable of change the public desires. It is clear, however, that not everyone in Washington is ready for a new face in Islamabad. According to a conversation with a policymaker in the State Department's Counter-terrorism Office, the U.S.—unlike Europe—continues to support the ex-General due to his counter-terrorism record.
Standing behind Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, who told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in November, Musharraf is an "indispensable" ally that America must continue to support. Negroponte's testimony is worth repeating to remind his fiercest opponents that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is tied to the leadership of one man. "Our challenge is to effectively support the Pakistani people and to help them strengthen the influence of the moderate, democratic center and fight violent extremism. With strong Congressional support of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since 2001, we are helping the Pakistani people move down a difficult but necessary path of moderation, stability, democracy, and prosperity."
My own view—and I have visited Pakistan numerous times and am actively engaged with senior officials both in Pakistan and the United States—is that America's goals in Pakistan is not to support a transition to a democratic government but to ensure that Washington has a partner in Islamabad that keeps radical Islamists from seizing power, battles al-Qaeda fighters and the Taliban in the northern areas, and protects Pakistan's nuclear assets. Seen through the lens of Washington's counter-terrorism objectives, Musharraf has been a fair ally.
Third, political rivals Bhutto and Sharif have proven they are unable of forming a coalition. Their disagreements and nasty party politics preclude them from standing together in a time of political crisis. Instead, both contenders further provoke the army's "moderate oligarchy", a term borrowed from Pakistan expert Steven Cohen at the Brookings Institute in Washington, D.C. By decorating their political slogans with words such as "reform" and "freedom", both Bhutto and Sharif have fooled the world community. If historical accuracy is correct, then a closer examination of these leaders' previous stints in office illustrates their nepotism, corruption, and fury for an institution they need most to legitimate their rule—the army, clearly Pakistan's strongest and most stable organization. Without the armed forces, any civilian leader in Pakistan is stripped of his/her ability to enforce sound policy decisions.
Finally, Musharraf is incorrectly viewed by the West as the instigator for global jihad. This claim is exaggerated. Pakistan might be the new "center of gravity" for international terrorism, according to Pakistani scholar Ahmed Rashid, given the reemergence of al-Qaeda and the creation of the Pakistani Taliban in recent years. But, as Musharraf has stated on national television, Pakistan's terrorism problem is the fall-out from Islamabad's support for Washington during the Cold War. According to Musharraf, "26 years of warfare and militancy" explains why the country today is struggling with an armed Taliban, equally violent domestic groups, and an al-Qaeda unwilling to relocate from Pakistan's unsettled or northern areas.
In a private discussion with the Director of the Federal Investigative Agency in Islamabad, I was told that Pakistan's jihadi problem is a spillover from the Afghan war. "We have thousands of jihadis willing to fight and with no other place to go except Pakistan."
That extremists find refuge in Pakistan worries the West the most, as connections to terror plots in the United Kingdom have all been linked to Pakistani operatives and training camps. How capable and willing Musharraf is to eradicate terrorists depends not on Western gifts of aid but the country's perception of external threats that has, in previous years, demanded that Islamabad keep on reserve a number of domestic jihadi groups to counter hostile neighbors.
Where Pakistan is Heading
The result is that Musharraf's mistakes over the past year has made him an unpopular statesman, both at home and abroad—despite the continued U.S. backing for his rule. In a meeting with high-ranking political officers at the Embassy of the Netherlands in Washington, D.C., it is clear to some Europeans that Musharraf's days are numbered. Pakistan analysts in the U.S. intelligence community would hope for the opposite. With first-hand knowledge, it is clear that U.S. intelligence officers, who are not named here for security reasons, view Musharraf as indispensable, though not incorruptible.
Since Musharraf's emergency rule, which will likely be lifted in days, opponents have touted the one-man-has-left-the-country-hostage as their saving grace. Both Sharif and Bhutto unsurprisingly overplay the idea that Pakistan is on the "brink of disaster"—a country near collapse if Musharraf remains in power. Bhutto's well-crafted message that Pakistan is a failing state is backed by the Foreign Policy magazine's list that names Pakistan as among the world's top ten failed states. Pakistan's failure to establish and nurture democratic traditions is of grave concern, and is partly due to corruptions, feudal lords, high illiteracy rates, and a host of other problems not listed here. But Pakistan is no Somalia. It is not a country without institutions or a civil-military foundation, no matter how feeble it is today.
Despite its weaknesses, the country has survived political impasses before. The military has served a vital role in stabilizing the country from meddlesome neighbors as well as internal extremist groups. No matter how unpopular Musharraf may be today, the army as an institution has extended its reach into civilian society and arguably more powerful than in years past.
What Pakistan needs is to leave the public space open to the "forces of progress", namely the judiciary and the media. What the world community should demand is a free and fair election in January 2008 with the hope that the new leader will honor the people's right to democratic freedoms, as well as silence all those who are gripped with paranoia of a failed state in the making.
Farhana Ali
Rand Corporation
