Swine flu cases 28 June. Red - fatalities, black-confirmed, grey suspected
Resilience in the food chain during a pandemic?
Cranfield University's Dr Helen Peck warns how the UK's food supply chain would quickly unravel in the event of a national disaster such as a pandemic or failure in the National Grid
Consumers in the UK enjoy the benefits of some of the world's most efficient grocery supply chains. The retailers offer a vast selection of high quality food and drinks from all over the world 24/7. But how would the quartermasters of England cope today with a prolonged disruption to fuel supplies, the failure of the National Grid or the widely anticipated outbreak of a human flu pandemic?
These and other questions were answered in a report published previously by Cranfield University's Dr Helen Peck. Resilience in the Food Chain presents the findings of a one-year study commissioned by the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (Defra). Its purpose is to contribute towards 'evidence-based' policy making for food chain emergencies.
A total of 61 senior managers from 28 organisations - including some of the county's leading supermarket chains, wholesalers, food and drinks manufacturing companies, their ingredient suppliers, packagers and transport providers - took part in this study. Their frank, but necessarily anonymous, testimonies form the core of this report.
The work aimed to identify the scope, extent and limitations of continuity planning practices and procedures within organisations involved in the supply of essential foodstuffs, including politically sensitive staples such as bread, milk, bottled water and infant formula. The managers interviewed also identified and discussed in detail the causes of actual disruptions experienced, near misses and known weaknesses in their supply chains. They also describe the likely effects of the three scenarios outlined above on their own operations.
The findings of the study reveal that business continuity management is recognised as an important new discipline and a growing concern. It is driven by the requirements of regulatory compliance, experience of disruptions, customer demands and insurance concerns. Those managers who have inherited the task of implementation describe how they struggle with a lack of resources and the ever-present pressures of 'business-as-usual'. Nevertheless progress is being made to ensure that individual organisations can maintain their operations, but this is largely under the assumption of otherwise normal external conditions. In the event of a widespread disruption, including the three scenarios investigated in this research, the report describes how things could begin to unravel quite quickly.
In the event of an energy shortage/grid failure most companies had uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) cover for mission critical IT, communications, and other Head Office functions. Similarly, most of the managers reported some back-up power provision in their distribution centres (DCs). More worryingly, the study found the smaller retail groups and wholesalers had no back-up power provision at retail sites. The same was true of some of the largest superstores. In many instances the retailers and wholesalers had taken rational decision that the closure of any store/branch would not threaten the survival of the business. Moreover, that given the historical reliability of the National Grid, the business case could not be made to justify the cost of providing or maintaining generators at all stores. However, in the event of a prolonged widespread power outage, or a shortage resulting in significant rolling power cuts, it became apparent that the DCs would rapidly run out of storage space for undeliverable/ returned loads, which would reduce throughput. Normal contingency measures for loss of DC operations (e.g. direct to store delivery) would not work in this instance. Several days notice of managed power cuts would be required to allow an orderly rescheduling of deliveries to stores. At manufacturing sites similar issues began to emerge. Some companies could maintain operations independently of the National Grid, but others had either abandoned alternative supplies or were operating sites where the power draw was too great for such provision to have ever been a viable option.
In addition, the study revealed inherent conflicts of interest for the largest retailers in the event of fuel shortages or pandemic flu. In a fuel crisis their first concern is to keep deliveries of high volume essential lines running to the stores, which sits badly with existing statutory obligations on fuel suppliers to maintain supplies to other designated priority users (the system is now under review). In the event of an outbreak of pandemic flu retailers are torn between a duty of care to employees, who would be exposed to infection, and their knowledge that their in-store pharmacies could become treatment centres. There were also fears amongst all the retailers – large and small - over the possibility of public disorder and concerns about the role of police and the armed forces in such an eventuality.
The report identifies generic options for improvement (for companies and government), which could improve the overall resilience of the supply chains. Amongst the conclusions drawn are that Government should consult with retailers and wholesalers to identify priority lines (including non-food and pharmaceutical) which are likely to be moving through the same channels at the same time. It also highlights a raft of regulations relating to competition, employers' duty of care, working times, state benefit entitlement and product labelling which may have to be waived to allow industry to maintain supplies of food and drink during a national emergency.
This article first appeared in ContingencyToday.com in June 2007; it has been reproduced becuase its findings are even more topical.
A full text copy of Resilience in the Food Chain can be downloaded from the Defra Science website or via the following link: http:// www.dcmt.cranfield.ac.uk/ddmsa/resilience/Helen_Peck
For further details of this and related research contact:
Dr Helen Peck, The Resilience Centre Department of Defence Management & Security Analysis, Cranfield Universityh.peck@cranfield.ac.uk/hpeck.cu@defenceacademy.mod.uk
