Why modern terrorists are different
Ms Farhana Ali, an international policy analyst with the Rand Corporation describes in an exclusive interview with Contingency Today how modern terrorist organisations are different from those in the past
This year's DGI Europe conference took place at London's QE II centre, 22-25 January 2007. It is Europe's annual gathering of international defence geospatial intelligence experts, providing a forum to discuss and debate the development of geospatial intelligence capabilities across the globe.
One speaker was Ms Farhana Ali, an international policy analyst with the RAND Corporation who spoke on the subject of how the terrorist threat will influence the type of geospatial data required in the future.
I started by asking Ms Farhana Ali what is different about modern terrorists organisations from those in the past? She gave a detailed and considered response: "While the aftermath of 9/11 has forced intelligence agencies and world leaders to refocus their efforts against terrorist networks, the phenomenon has existed for well over 2000 years. Terrorism has had a long history that has included tyrants, ethno-nationalists, and even religious fanatics, dating as far back as the time of the Crusades when a Muslim group called the Assassins committed brutal acts of murder. Traditional terrorist groups, with an ethno-nationalist slogan, included movements like the Abu Nidal Organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, Hizballah, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Armed Islamic Group.
"They issued communiques taking credit for -- and explaining -- their actions, and their memberships were numerically constrained. More traditional terrorist groups set their aims and motivations within a contextual framework; that is, they arguably chose violence to respond to a particular event or policy. The Egyptian Gama'at al-Islamiyya or Tanzim al Jihad used indiscriminate violence in their efforts to overthrow the Egyptian governments of Gamal Abd Nasser and Anwar Sadat. And the early Al Qaeda leadership, including the late Abdullah Azzam, emphasized the need to liberate Palestine in his memoirs and articles published in the Peshawar-based Al Jihad magazine during the 1980s. In short, personal events in the Arab world became the contemporary jihadi movements raison d'etre.
"As terrorism has evolved, the study has become far more complex. The study of the psychological and behavioral bases of terrorism began to receive far greater attention in the early 1970s, when theories were generated to explain the frustration and group dynamics of terrorists. Academics began to focus on individual versus collective identity, but no one had an understanding of Osama Bin Laden's wider jihadi network until attacks in the 1990s and onward were taken seriously by intelligence, let alone academics.
"In the past, some terrorist organisations were clearly identified and known to us. Many of the earlier terrorist groups were often based on secular nationalist movements such as the early Palestinian groups and many of these groups took credit for their attacks. Claiming credit for attacks, such as hijackings of airplanes and hostage takings, enabled these groups to broadcast their political grievances to a broader audience. Their use of the media (the television) allowed us to see the perpetrators of terror attacks. Today, however, we do not know who the terrorists are, except that they include a myriad of loosely knit groups, cells, and individuals inspired by the al-Qaeda movement but operate independently.
"The evolution of terrorist networks since then is the result of intense crack-down by the world's security agencies against religious extremists and terrorists since 9/11. The loss of Afghanistan as a safe haven for the mujahideen and other affiliated groups, such as al Qaeda, also is significant. Groups no longer have training camps nor can they meet openly to discuss tactical and operational planning. While Afghanistan continues to be used by the Taliban in the southern province, for example, it is a different environment today than it was during the Afghan jihad.
"Thus, the continuing crackdown by the West and its allies has forced terrorists to adopt more clandestine measures to conceal their identities and evade detection, arrest, and death by security agencies worldwide. What we have today are networks that have learned from the past; they know how to adapt and adjust to increased scrutiny by security agencies. They know how to effectively use new technologies to their benefit. For example, the use of the Internet enables groups to broadcast their message to new audiences, maintain anonymity, create networks of supporters and sympathizers worldwide, and most importantly, conceal their whereabouts.
"So it's not even necessary any more for someone in Sudan to be linked to someone in Pakistan or the US. The internet allows them to replenish their ranks in a way that wasn't possible before. The internet and its interconnectivity is a virtual university for religious extremism."
I asked Ms Ali to elaborate on her use of the term flatter networks, which she had used in her talk: "Flat networks don't have a key organised leader. This doesn't mean they don't have a cell leader but you have these disparate, diverse cells. Previously al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan were connected to key operational and cell leaders in different regions of the world. There was a much more organised structure, with various committees and members of different rank and responsibility; some have called this a corporation-like model. Now you don't have that anymore, partly because of the of the increased crackdowns and the terrorists' use of disguise and other techniques that make it more difficult to track them today. Flatter organisations means they, although ideologically and inspirationally adhering to the mother al Qaeda organisation, can maintain a level of secrecy to protect operational planning as well as live amongst us. Terrorists' ability to live as ordinary citizens within mainstream Western societies calls little attention to them while enabling them to potentially gain access to a plethora of targets in the West. Even cells in the same area are not privy to operations taking place, and this level of secrecy enables then to operate more efficiently."
The term aspirational group had been used by Ms Ali. What did it mean? "I use this as a loose term describing individuals or pockets of population who sympathise with terrorist groups but are not active. Again, through the Internet, many people arguably are sympathetic to the general cause. When I was in Pakistan doing some field research, I spoke to a number of different clerics, from the Deobandi and Barelvi sect. One cleric said, as long as Bin Laden remains alive, he will appeal to disenfranchised youth in Pakistani cities."
Why not close down the internet? "We do close down sites; a lot aren't able to exist. A number of agencies and private individuals have been helpful in identifying terrorist websites. But, groups re-emerge under a different name, which is a testament to their technical sophistication and need to disguise their identity, movement, and activities. It is a constant battle in what I call the action-reaction mode because they have been very creative and are always one step ahead of intelligence agencies. After all there is only so much security agencies can do. Given the limitations of security agencies, the real solution to terrorism lies with the population in which terrorism breeds."
Information dominance is a term that might not be clear to everyone? "I use this term to describe how we weave together the different data collected from various agencies. We can come ahead if we learn how to integrate intelligence. Part of the problem has to do with how to share information with our partners; much of this is classified to protect our interests. Information even within the US government is compartmentalized from other US agencies, of which is more than a dozen. There is some debate now about how to share information across the various agencies and also how to make it more transparent with key allies. How much is enough? And who should have access to it? These are key questions to which there is no easy answer. Ultimately, it is a question of trust. By not sharing information, we may hinder our ability to act."
Ms Ali's talk had addressed the need to couple geospatial intelligence and human intelligence. She gave as an example the well-known overhead image believed to be of Bin Laden at Tarniq Farms. "Taking that that image of him was only possible through human intelligence. It wasn't just that we were overhead and suddenly captured this data. In order for there to have been a successful missile strike, you would have had to rely on field operators on the ground to learn about his movements. That's what I call a convenient marriage between human intelligence and geospatial intelligence. And it's going to be even more important in today's environment when terrorists operate in the urban terrain (i.e., densely populated cities). For example in a massive city like Karachi, if you only had an aerial overhead image, it would be very difficult to track terrorists unless you are working in coordination with the local police, the intelligence agency, and other field operators to understand where they (the terrorists) are. You may be able to capture photos of buildings, which are static, but one has to recognize that terrorists are always moving. So, a picture is not really worth a thousand words without the human intelligence. Keeping track of their daily movements is very difficult, so geospatial intelligence alone is not the answer."
Ms Ali had made reference before to leaks to the US media. I asked whether this was a deliberate policy by the federal agencies? "There is a lot of concern among the intelligence agencies about these leaks. It's a double-edged sword. Because when you leak this information you want the public to be aware of some of the terrorist threat so the public can remain vigilant and be the eyes and ears of security. After all, keeping the population informed is important to any successful counter-terrorism policy. On the other hand, how much information should the public have access to? And is it really useful? Have we created, for example with the US threat advisory - yellow, green, orange, red -a sense of paranoia? Does the public really know what to do when the advisory is orange versus red?"
In the UK we have Olympics coming up. What advice would she give UK policy makers? "The UK government, in coordination with other agencies, is keeping track of different networks and groups. In various media reports, there has been greater attention to a community-based approach which is to know the pulse (or the beat) of the street; this would include talking to local community members so they remain involved and report any suspicious activity to authorities.
"After the London bombings I was often asked why American Muslims are different from those in the UK? There are a number of reasons for this. First, US Muslims in general are far more integrated and consider themselves Americans. Second, Muslims who came to the US came from a higher socio-economic class. They came to America as professionals or to seek higher education. Third, and perhaps most importantly, many Muslim groups, including local imams, Muslim activists, and other individuals work closely with the FBI and local police. US law enforcement agencies are also making a concerted effort to actually work with the imams because they recognize that the imam, after all, is the eyes and ears of the community. You don't see the same kind of cooperation in Britain; some of the UK imams belong to the first generation of immigrants; they have not been fully integrated into the UK system, and some maintain publicly views that are anti-British."
My final question was why has Al Qaeda been successful in the UK?
"In my view, Al Qaeda has been able to exploit the UK's long history of involvement with the Muslim world. It looks back at Britain's (long) involvement in Iraq and British colonialism. These decade-long grievances appeal to the Muslim psyche." Jonathan Rush
